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THE STORY OF TIMOR ISLAND
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By Daniel O'Connor
Yale Political Quarterly

       On September 15, 1999, the United Nations Security Council approved a UN-led peacekeeping mission to East Timor, a small nation occupying half of a Pacific island that is unofficially part of Indonesia.  Since most Americans have never heard of East Timor, and certainly could not locate the country on a map, many were surprised and confused when reports of atrocities suddenly flooded the international media in early September of 1999.  Although the crisis looked grim, swift and decisive action has provided, at least for now, some semblance of stability in the region.  This international action not only suggests that peace between the involved powers is feasible, but also that the international community as a whole is starting to have greater appreciation for democratic and human rights ideals.

   HISTORIC BACKGROUND

       The East Timorese people have struggled for centuries to gain national autonomy.  As far back as the early 16th Century, Dutch and Portuguese colonists laid claim to Timor Island.  Although the Dutch relinquished control of West Timor to Indonesia in 1949, Portugal governed East Timor until 1974.  When the Portuguese abruptly left, unrest disrupted plans for independent East Timorese rule.  Factions in East Timor split between the Fretlin Party, which argued in favor of an independent East Timor, and those wanting to join Indonesia.  Nine days after civil war erupted in East Timor, Indonesian paratroopers invaded the fledgling state.  Officially, the international community objected to Indonesia's blatant aggression against East Timor.  During Indonesia's twenty-four year reign over the state, the United Nations has passed ten resolutions condemning Indonesia's occupation.  Most western countries refused to recognize East Timor as the "twenty-seventh state" of Indonesia, but rather a state controlled by a foreign power.  However, Cold War balance-of-power considerations, economic considerations, and post-Vietnam inhibitions discouraged Western powers from using force or other aggressive diplomatic techniques to free East Timor in 1975 or afterwards.  The Suharto regime was particularly hostile towards East Timor.  After the original invasion of East Timor, Suharto ordered the Indonesian army to continue killing thousands of East Timor citizens, torturing resistors and political leaders,  and starving innocent people in concentration camps.  A particularly savage massacre occurred in 1991 when Indonesian troops surrounded and gunned down 270 Timorese civilians at the Santa Cruz Cemetery in Dili.  Human rights organizations estimate that 200,000 East Timorese have died during Suharto's twenty-four year reign, twenty-five percent of the country's total population.  Human rights abuses against the East Timorese, such as the Santa Cruz massacre, have changed American policy towards Indonesia.  In 1993, Congress enacted legislation that made the sale of weapons to Indonesia conditional, based on respect for human rights in East Timor.  Other military prohibitions included a ban on small and light riot gear (1994), a ban on armored personnel carriers and helicopter-mounted equipment (1996) and the postponement of the sale of nine F-16 fighter planes (1996).

 THE RECENT CRISIS

       In 1998, the Asian economic crisis and other unrelated internal pressures forced President Suharto to resign from office.  Suharto chose as his successor B.J. Habibie a protégé whom Suharto expected to adhere to his policies.  However, Habibie surprisingly introduced reforms to Indonesia, most notably in regard to East Timor.  Although continuing some of the human rights abuses against the East Timorese, Habibie also released East Timorese political prisoners and to local leaders greater political control over local affairs.  Then, in the Spring of 1999, Habibie suddenly allowed East Timor to hold a referendum concerning their independence from Indonesia.  United Nations authorities aided Indonesia with plans to hold the election on in August of 1999.  The reforms took many Indonesians by surprise, including General Wiranto, the Chief of Indonesia's armed forces.  During the weeks leading up to the election, Wiranto may have become nervous that the independence of East Timor could lead to the dissolution of Indonesia.  Wiranto may also have grown accustomed to causing violence in Timor.  For whatever reason, before the election, Wiranto formed militias with Indonesians and East Timorese opposed to East Timor independence, presumably to skew or derail the referendum.  These militias caused serious carnage and havoc in East Timor.  However, immediately before the election, the militias backed off, and East Timor overwhelmingly voted for independence.  After the announcement of the official election results, the militias rampaged for nearly two weeks, killing thousands and pillaging the capital city of Dili.  The United Nations Children's Defense Fund estimates that 450,000 East Timorese fled either to the neighboring mountains or to Indonesian-controlled West Timor, a location that concerns many U.N. officials.  Many experts are still unsure exactly what caused this bloodshed.  Some suggest that pro-Jakartan East Timorese forces are using this violence as a way to demand some Indonesian enclave within East Timor.  Others argue that Indonesia is attempting to use this violence as a warning to separatist movements in East Timor and to wreak vengeance on the state.  This argument seems unlikely since Indonesia itself offered the referendum.  Still others argue that Habibie is trying to regain faith with his military advisors on the East Timor issue to win re-election later this fall.  This is even less likely because Habibie has, although ineptly, tried to resolve this crisis peacefully.  As news of the crisis spread, the international community rushed to the defense of East Timor.  Australia, the closest regional power, immediately transported 500 peace keepers to East Timor.  Over September and October of 1999, Australia increased its support, now the largest single force on the island.  The U.N. Security Council, having received pressure from U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, pressed for an invitation from Indonesia to help mediate a resolution to the crisis.  Receiving it, the Security Council adopted a resolution authorizing a peacekeeping mission of over 8,000 soldiers.  Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove led the peacekeeping operations.

  NEW ERA OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION

      Although the East Timor situation has not yet reached its conclusion, one can already draw a number of important lessons from the crisis management.  First, assuming that the peacekeeping forces succeed in stabilizing East Timor, the United Nations will have demonstrated not only the viability of collective security, but also the U.N's important role in establishing peace.  American allies who have a greater security interest in Indonesian stability, such as Australia, are providing more resources to serve mutual interests, thereby alleviating pressures on the already over-extended U.S. military.  The intervention by the United Nations in East Timor also upholds global principles of democracy and human rights.  The intervention may come to represent an affirmation of the right of people everywhere, after suffering a long train of abuses, to peacefully and rationally declare their independence from such rule.  The intervention also seems to uphold the doctrine of majority rule, enforcing the vote in a way that adheres to the overwhelming desire of the majority, rather than caving in to fractious militancy.  The mission demonstrates a concerted commitment of the international community to uphold international standards of human rights.  As Kofi Annan stated:  "While we may still only dream of a world dedicated to a common perception of human rights, the action in East Timor may be one indication that the international community is ready to take steps toward this goal.
 
 

BRANDON PRESS